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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
The EU’s Role in  
Addressing Lebanon’s 
Multiple Crises
The Beirut Port blast (BPB) has revealed the fundamental failure 
of the Lebanese political system, but deep democratic reforms will 
take time and are fraught with risks. Given the US withdrawal and 
the extreme tensions in the region, the EU has a critical role to play 
in addressing the short-term humanitarian crisis, responding to the 
economic and financial situation, and providing a forum for civil 
society empowerment. If it fails to do so, the price is further geopo-
litical destabilization.
 – Lebanon’s current economic crisis has its roots planted deep in 
the post-civil war political settlement. The Taif Agreement of 
1989 secured peace but established a clan- and religion-based 
political system that needs to be overhauled. This will be a long 
process and requires civil society empowerment.   
 – The EU can play a critical role by rapidly launching an EU trust 
fund to collect and channel international support to civil society 
organizations and ensure the highest level of transparency and 
accountability. 
 – Addressing the economic and financial crises requires: (i) a large 
financial assistance program; (ii) a far-reaching sovereign debt 
restructuring, and (iii) a profound restructuring of the domestic 
banking system. The EU should be actively engaged in all three.
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Introduction 
The blast in the port of Beirut has provoked a hu-
manitarian crisis and highlighted a state failure that 
is at the heart of overlapping financial, economic, 
and political crises. With hundreds of deaths, thou-
sands of injured, nearly 300,000 people made home-
less, and a health system already overstretched by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, Beirut requires enormous 
humanitarian assistance and support to meet the re-
constructions needs1. 
Stabilizing the situation in Lebanon is of crucial im-
portance to Europe. The recent flaring up of tensions 
in Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the quagmires in 
Syria and Libya should motivate the EU to do every-
thing it can to keep Lebanon’s financial, economic, 
and political crisis from escalating into an explosive 
geopolitical situation. 
THE EU CAN PLAY A CRITICAL 
ROLE IN THREE AREAS
So far, only a modest amount of humanitarian aid has 
been provided, a small fraction of the true cost of re-
pairing the damages done by the BPB. Channeling 
large sums rapidly will require the EU to set up an EU 
trust fund, work closely with civil society organiza-
tions, and devise new ways of delivering aid that can 
ensure transparency and accountability. This is par-
ticularly important given the doubts surrounding the 
current Lebanese government. 
Lebanon’s humanitarian situation is made worse by 
an ongoing economic and financial crisis. The EU 
should support and lead the IMF’s efforts for a large 
debt restructuring operation, a substantial restruc-
turing and recapitalization of the banking system, 
and a significant external adjustment program. In ad-
dition to an IMF program, multilateral development 
banks (including the EIB and the EBRD) as well as the 
EU’s own Macro Financial Assistance program will 
need to contribute.
1  BBC, “Beirut reconstruction could cost up to $15bn”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p08my9q9 (accessed August 23, 2020)
SIDA, , “Sida ger stöd till de hårt drabbade i Beirut”,  https://www.sida.se/Svenska/aktuellt-och-press/Medieservice-och-presskontakt/
pressmeddelanden/2020/sida-ger-stod-till-de-hart-drabbade-i-beirut/ (accessed August 28, 2020)
Government of Canada, “Canada’s response to the crisis in Lebanon”, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_
developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/lebanon-liban.aspx?lang=eng (accessed August 28, 2020)
2 For a summary of Paris I and II see: David Schenker, “Lebanon goes to Paris,” The Washington Institute, January 24, 2007,  
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/lebanon-goes-to-paris-iii-high-stakes-in-france-and-beirut, accessed August 23, 2020 
Finally, this crisis cannot be resolved without ad-
dressing the domestic political root causes of the 
problem. This represents a tall order and entails 
huge risks. The entire political settlement that has 
governed Lebanon’s economic and political settle-
ment needs to be revisited. This is a long process 
that requires intense dialogue with civil society or-
ganizations and civic movements with the ambition 
of creating a real political dialogue leading up to new 
elections. The powers (Saudi-Arabia, the US) that 
helped broker the Taif Agreement in 1989 cannot be 
counted on to do the same today, and the EU there-
fore needs to be more involved. 
20 YEARS OF FAILURE 
For nearly 20 years, Lebanon has been on life sup-
port from the international community.  Between 
2001 and 2018, the country received more than $23 
billion in the form of humanitarian assistance and 
development aid (Paris I, Paris II, Paris III, Stock-
holm international donors’ conference, CEDRE con-
ference)2. Yet none of these donors’ conferences 
– mostly spearheaded by France – have enabled a 
stable and sustainable economy to emerge. They 
were too small and too captive of the existing polit-
ical system to make a difference, and the Lebanese 
commitment to reform was too weak. This is part of 
the reason why the last donors’ conference, which 
took place after the terrible explosion at the Bei-
rut port, produced such modest international sup-
port. Donor fatigue has set in, and a new approach is 
needed that delivers more profound change. 
Instead of a new donors’ conference, the EU should 
establish a trust fund and create a new frame-
work to deliver financial assistance on the ground. 
This requires innovation: The EU will need a com-
prehensive map of effective civil society organiza-
tions on the ground and an intelligent way to dis-
tribute funds to them while taking into account the 
payment restrictions affecting the domestic banking 
system. It will also have to introduce a process of ac-
countability and transparency that has been miss-
ing from previous assistance and reconstruction ef-
forts, including those led by the EU. This should lead 
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PLEDGES BY DONOR, IN MILLION USD
European Commission 35.3 74.2
Qatar 50.0 50
Kuwait 41.0 41
France 35.3 35.3
UK 26.1 32.6
Germany 23.5 23.5
Denmark 24 23.5
US 17
Italy 10.6 10.6
UN 9
Belgium 7.1 7.1
Canada 6.5 30
Norway 8.2 8.2
Cyprus 5.9 5.9
Australia 5 5
Switzerland 4.4 4.4
Netherlands 3 3
Hungary 1.2
South Korea 1
Sweden 0.5
Total 286 383 source: news agencies1
TOTAL ANNOUNCED PLEDGES
PLEDGES AGREED AT INTERNATIONAL DONORS’ CONFERENCE
80
40
0
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international and European donors toward the most 
decentralized support possible, bypassing as much as 
possible governmental structures until confidence in 
their delivery capacity is restored. But this requires a 
precise mapping and assessment of local civil society 
organizations and therefore a great degree of devo-
lution of the aid distribution process to aid agencies 
and personnel on the ground. The EU also needs to 
ensure traceability and accountability of the funds it 
distributes but without relying on a new bureaucracy 
of consultants and aid specialists.  
A NEW FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
PACKAGE LED BY THE EU
Lebanon’s domestic crisis started just under a year 
ago. Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned on October 
29, 2019, after two weeks of massive protests against 
corruption and nepotism in his government. The re-
sult was profound political uncertainty which aggra-
vated an already fragile economic situation. Leba-
non is now hit by a combination of a banking crisis, a 
balance of payment crisis, and a sovereign debt cri-
sis. For years, the country’s banking system relied on 
large inflows of foreign deposits. When they stopped, 
a large current account deficit and capital outflows 
drained a large part of the foreign exchange reserves. 
Finally, the government cannot service its debt any-
more. This situation cannot be addressed without 
substantial external assistance and an IMF program, 
but talks have stalled. 
In February 2020, given the lack of liquidity in US 
dollars, the Lebanese government was forced to an-
nounce a moratorium on its external debt. The next 
step, in late April, was the presentation of an ambi-
tious recovery plan3, which has the merit of clear-
ly setting out the need for reform and adjustment. 
Yet its implementation has been held back due to 
the difficulty of agreeing on a critical mass of “pri-
or actions” required by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). These include a law guaranteeing the 
independence of the judiciary, the appointment of 
a new regulatory authority and a new board of di-
rectors for the electricity sector, and a law on pub-
lic procurement. 
3 Mike Azar, “Analyzing the Government Plan & Comparing it with the Draft,” May 4, 2020. Provides links to the final version of the plan as well as an earlier 
leak and analyses the evolution of the government’s position. https://finance4lebanon.com/analyzing-the-final-government-plan-comparing-it-with-the-
draft/, accessed August 23, 2020
4 Gino Raidy, “How Draft Bills in the US Congress Influence the Lebanese Sulta,” June 11, 2020, https://ginosblog.com/how-draft-bills-in-the-us-congress-
influence-the-lebanese-sulta-b98178ecbbbb,  accessed August 23, 2020
The recovery plan is also facing substantial inter-
nal opposition. Critics have pointed out that the 
recovery plan sets highly unrealistic goals for the 
government’s fiscal policy. Indeed, few countries of 
this income level would be able to sustain a primary 
surplus of 3.8 percent of GDP in the midst of a pro-
found recession for years. This means that a pro-
gram should attempt to be more gradual and there-
fore longer. As a result, however, the financing needs 
of Lebanon would in fact be much larger than the 
government and the IMF are prepared to contem-
plate. Indeed, given Lebanon’s quota at the IMF, the 
Fund would normally not be willing to lend it more 
than $4 billion to $5 billion. However, the IMF has a 
framework to allow exceptional access which could 
mean doubling Lebanon’s credit line. But such a step 
would require a very strong level of international po-
litical support which seems hard to come by at the 
moment.
IMF and MFA 
The government has conducted more than a doz-
en meetings with the IMF to negotiate financial sup-
port since March 2020. The realization that interna-
tional financial assistance is unavoidable has sunk in 
even with those elements of the Lebanese govern-
ment which were initially strongly opposed. But any 
final agreement with the IMF will require the sup-
port of the US administration, and there are a num-
ber of voices in the administration as well as in Con-
gress that are reluctant at best and opposed at worst. 
For example, the Republican Study Committee, a 
caucus of conservative members of the Republican 
Party in the House of Representatives, has recently 
recommended sanctions against key political fig-
ures in Lebanon4, which could make an IMF Board 
approval more challenging. On the Lebanese side, 
disagreements between the central bank, the gov-
ernment, and the banking sector have hampered the 
negotiations and caused delays to the voting of the 
prior actions in the parliament. 
Notwithstanding the necessary technical exper-
tise of the IMF, it would be useful for the EU to be 
strongly involved in the international financial assis-
tance. While regional institutions like the Arab Mon-
etary Fund could in principle be useful, they seem 
too weak and probably too politically divided to in-
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tervene successfully5. However, the EU has a facili-
ty designed to assist countries in its neighborhood as 
they undertake an IMF program. Such Macro Finan-
cial Assistance (MFA) programs have recently been 
used in Ukraine and Jordan. Some €3 billion were 
granted to eight countries in the EU’s neighborhood 
in response to their greater needs and the COVID-19 
crisis6. There was also an earlier MFA program for 
Lebanon7, too, which proved useful8. 
With the much greater sum needed today, however, 
there is a potential issue: The size of the MFA is lim-
ited by the size of the Guarantee Fund for External 
Actions which in turn is constrained by the resources 
ceiling available under the current and future Multi 
Annual Financial Framework. The Lebanese govern-
ment’s own calculation of external funding needs 
(described by the government as optimistic) are in 
the range of $28 billion until 2024. This means that 
even an exceptionally large IMF program of $10 bil-
lion would require considerable other multilateral 
and bilateral sources of support. The World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank, and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development could probably 
add up to $7 billion to $8 billion, but this would leave 
as much as $10 billion to be covered by bilateral sup-
port and the EU’s MFA.
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
In calculating the country’s financing needs, the 
Lebanese government assumed that a significant re-
duction of external debt could be negotiated with 
international creditors. In February 2020, Lebanon 
had declared a moratorium for all outstanding Euro-
bonds; the total sum amounts to $31.3 billion. A sharp 
reduction in external debt would reduce the drain on 
foreign reserves. Yet the problem of sovereign debt 
concerns both external financing and domestic fis-
cal sustainability. It is generally accepted that rough-
ly $45 billion worth of domestic currency losses need 
to be recognized and allocated because the IMF will 
only agree to new loans if it considers Lebanon’s 
public debt to “sustainable with a high probability.” 
5  Barbara Fritz and Laurissa Mühlich, “Regional Financial Arrangements in the Global Financial Safety Net: The Arab and the Eurasian Fund”, July 2018, 
https://www.lai.fu-berlin.de/homepages/fritz/publikationen/regional-financial-arrangements-in-the-global-financial-safety-net_the-arab-and-the-
eurasian-fund.pdf, accessed August 25, 2020
6  EUR-Lex, “Decision (EU) 2020/701 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on providing macro-financial assistance to 
enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic,” May 25, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020D0701, accessed August 23, 2020
7 EUR-Lex, “Decision (EU) 2020/701 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on providing macro-financial assistance to 
enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic,” May 25, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020D0701, accessed August 23, 2020
8 Ecorys, “Ex-post evaluation of Macro Financial Assistance operations to Lebanon,” May 2, 2012,  https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/evaluation/
pdf/evaluation_lebanon_en.pdf, accessed August 23, 2020
9 Brad Setser, “Lebanon’s Imminent Financial Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/lebanons-imminent-
financial-crisis, accessed August 23, 2020
Domestic Financial Stability
The Lebanese economy has operated for years with 
a bloated banking system (its assets amount to more 
than 400 percent of the country’s GDP). Lebanon 
successfully played the role of a regional financial 
center but also acted as a convenient laundering sys-
tem for most of the Middle East. The success of the 
Lebanese banking industry was built on cooperation 
with the central bank, the Banque du Liban: Com-
mercial banks paid a very high premium on US Dollar 
deposits in order to attract foreign currency depos-
it from the Lebanese diaspora and from the Mid-
dle East. They were able to pay these high interest 
rates because the Central Bank was in turn paying 
high interest on Certificates of Deposits, denominat-
ed in Lebanese pounds, that the commercial banks 
were investing in. At the same time, the central bank 
maintained the exchange rate between the US dol-
lar and the Lebanese pound stable. This strategy al-
lowed Lebanon to finance a large current account 
and fiscal deficit by attracting between $5 billion to 
$10 billion in new deposits each year between 2005 
and 20189.
This arrangement came to an abrupt end at the end 
of last year when political events (the demonstra-
tions as well as the abduction and resignation of 
Prime Minister Hariri) created profound political un-
certainty. As a result, a massive flight of capital pre-
cipitated a banking crisis that now forces profound 
restructuring, consolidation, balance sheet clean-
up, and recapitalization of the banking system. The 
key question is how to distribute the losses arising 
from the domestic debt restructuring. One option 
would be to put the burden on the Banque du Liban 
and spare the commercial banking system. At least 
in theory, the central bank could operate with neg-
ative equity and recoup its losses over a very long 
period of time through seigniorage revenues. The 
second option is to impose the loss on the commer-
cial banking system and divide the burden between 
depositors and shareholders. The third option is a 
scheme that the Lebanese banking system is arguing 
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for, which would force the government to privatize 
a large number of state assets. Yet this will be diffi-
cult because external creditors will claim these as-
sets and the IMF will need the proceeds to reduce 
the government’s debt over the medium term. 
The apportionment of losses on Lebanese deposi-
tors poses a difficult political question. Indeed, ac-
cording to Bisat, Cassard and Diwan10, a bail-in to 
recoup all of the losses would wipe out 33 percent 
of all deposits, or more than 55 percent of depos-
its above $500,000 (representing about two percent 
of all accounts), or 70 percent of deposits over 
$1 million (representing about one percent of all ac-
counts). It would constitute one of the largest bail-ins 
of depositors in modern economic history. Any such 
decision would be likely to force a much-needed 
audit of capital flight over the last several months, 
which could put the spotlight on a number of per-
sons of high net worth and political exposure. In-
deed, even after capital controls were introduced, 
there has been continuous leakage of foreign ex-
change reserves which suggests a selective applica-
tion of the capital controls.
On balance, there is a case for a more gradual loss 
recognition and for allowing some of the losses to be 
placed on the central bank’s balance sheet. But even 
if in theory, the Banque du Liban can run with sub-
stantial negative equity, its ability to sustain a given 
exchange rate policy would probably be undermined 
unless its credibility was strengthened by interna-
tional/bilateral support in the form of foreign ex-
change swap lines, for example.
A Role for the ECB?
The Lebanese economy was extremely dollarized for 
historical reasons, in particular because of its role in 
the recycling of petrodollars from the Middle East. 
However, its trade with the EU represents more than 
30 percent of total trade. It would be worth con-
sidering to base any new exchange rate regime on 
a basket of currencies that would include the eu-
ro. In this context – and in accordance with the im-
plementation of an IMF program that would restore 
financial stability and the country’s balance of pay-
ments – the European Central Bank could consider 
extending a temporary swap line to the Banque du 
10  Amer Bisat, Marcel Cassard, and Ishac Diwan, “A grave crisis with no silver bullet”, Carnegie Middle East Center, May 2020. https://carnegie-mec.
org/2020/05/11/grave-crisis-with-no-silver-bullet-pub-81752, accessed August 25, 2020
11  With the COVID-19 crisis, the ECB has created a new facility for bilateral repo with international central banks in order to provide euro liquidity 
internationally. While this is far from a bilateral swap line, it shows some openness from the ECB to provide Euro liquidity to central banks in need on a 
temporary and emergency basis. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200625~60373986e5.en.html, accessed September 9, 2020
Liban11. This would have a powerful symbolic dimen-
sion and would greatly help to restore confidence in 
the country and in its restructured banking system. 
Even though the European Central Bank has never 
taken this step in the context of a financial assistance 
package, such a temporary swap line would also go 
to some length in furthering the EU’s objective of in-
ternationalizing the euro.
Finally, and this is rarely discussed by the IMF or the 
Lebanese government, the potential oil and gas reve-
nues that could be generated from possible reserves 
identified off the coast of Lebanon have so far been 
disregarded. The intense bickering over these issues 
in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea should remind 
us both of Lebanon’s strategic position for a future 
Eastern Mediterranean pipeline and of its long-term 
economic potential.
CIVIL SOCIETY BUILDING 
TOWARD A NEW DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
These economic and financial changes will not hap-
pen without profound political reform. The Taif 
agreement of 1989 effectively ended Lebanon’s civil 
war and organized the representation of all political, 
clan, and religious forces in Lebanon. But it also set 
up a predatory state marked by widespread corrup-
tion, nepotism, and crony capitalism that is largely 
responsible for today’s economic and financial crisis.
Civil society activism started to gain momentum in 
2015, when thousands of people took to the streets 
in Beirut in response to a garbage collection crisis. At 
the same time, a movement set up to support Syrian 
refugees started to gain ground. This civil society en-
gagement reached a new level in the fall of 2019 and 
culminated with the so-called October 17th move-
ment. It now takes the form of a myriad of organi-
zations. Some already fielded candidates at the last 
general elections, while others are more focused on 
social issues and local activism. These movements 
have become incredibly vocal and powerful, and the 
Beirut Port blast has galvanized them. Still, this civil 
society opposition remains largely unstructured and 
somewhat decentralized, which makes it difficult to 
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bring it into a political negotiation process. This, in 
turn, allows proponents of the establishment to dis-
count the claims and demands for radical change.
In this situation, outside help could make a big 
difference. The HD Center in Switzerland12, the 
Berghof Foundation13 in Germany, and Sant Egidio14 
in Italy are organizations that could provide a forum 
for these civil society organizations to meet in a neu-
tral context free of the political pressure of Leba-
nese or international actors. They could help them 
structure their demands and prepare for a possible 
role in the future political dialogue and reconcilia-
tion process.
This sort of civil society empowerment is necessary 
if one wants to envisage a political dialogue between 
the old and the new stakeholders in Lebanon. On the 
one hand, the new movements’ legitimacy is rooted 
in their demand for radical change and a complete 
break with the past, while all historical political par-
ties have been tainted by the exercise of power. On 
the other hand, it is unlikely that there can be a last-
ing political solution without a process of dialogue 
and compromise with all political forces. The new 
political movements’ efforts to move away from a po-
litical life almost exclusively organized around clan-
based loyalties that were set in stone with the Taif 
Agreement of 1989 are laudable. But this settlement 
served to pacify Lebanon and organize a semblance 
of political stability for the past 30 years. Rewriting it 
in view of today’s democratic demands and economic 
reality will undoubtedly be a long process.
Indeed, it seems hard to imagine that a system so 
central to the organization of the entire political, so-
cial, and economic life could be uprooted as radically 
as the demonstrators and civil society activists de-
mand. If the recent experience of Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
or Iraq is any guide, revolutions and democratization 
processes are long, and international meddling is of-
ten perilous. Profound political reforms are inevita-
ble; they are also essential to stabilize the Lebanese 
economy. 
This requires a sort of homegrown truth, dialogue, 
and reconciliation process which will require tre-
mendous engagement with existing civil society 
12  The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a Swiss-based private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality, and 
independence, https://www.hdcentre.org/
13  The Berghof Foundation is an independent, non-governmental, and non-profit organisation that supports efforts to prevent political and social violence 
and to achieve sustainable peace through conflict transformation, https://www.berghof-foundation.org/
14  Sant’Egidio has been involved in numerous peace negotiations as a facilitator or observer including in Albania and Algeria. The Community’s most 
significant diplomatic achievement was the mediation of the Peace Agreement for Mozambique in 1992, https://www.santegidio.org/
organizations to ensure their genuine representation 
and participation in this process. Yet precipitation 
would be dangerous given the current state of pol-
itics. There is also no obvious broker for a new Taif 
Agreement. Middle Eastern actors are probably too 
partisan to play a role, and many European countries 
are also ruled out for variety of reasons. Germany 
has declared the Hezbollah a terrorist organization, 
while France has a colonial history in Lebanon and 
supported previous governments to an extent that 
could discredit its efforts today. The question of 
whether an external broker would help or endanger 
a domestic political dialogue is therefore open, but 
non-governmental civil society support seems like a 
necessary and worthwhile effort.
CONCLUSION
The EU has an important role to play in Lebanon, 
both financially and politically. This assistance 
should at least initially take the form of patient civil 
society empowerment. Recent experiences of state-
craft and democratization processes led by foreign 
governments call for extreme caution and patience. 
But if the EU fails to play its part, or limits its inter-
vention to humanitarian support, it will be complicit 
not only in a protracted economic and political crisis. 
It would also carry responsibility for the possible re-
sumption of a sectarian conflict with deep and last-
ing regional and geopolitical consequences.
Rauchstraße 17/18 
10787 Berlin
Tel. +49 30 2542311-0
info@dgap.org 
www.dgap.org 
 @dgapev
The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP).
Publisher 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
Auswärtige Politik e.V.
ISSN 2198-5936
Editing Bettina Vestring 
Layout and Info Graphics  
Luise Rombach
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
